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NATIONAL GUARDSMEN
AND TORT LIABILITY
From the standpoint of tort liability, the National Guardsman
occupies a unique position with respect to members of the other
military services. The United States Government accepts liability
for torts committed by all military personnel in the performance
of their duty, except for personnel of the National Guard. This
situation exists because of the persistent notion that the National
Guard is still basically a state organization and therefore the federal
government can not be held liable for torts committed by Guard
personnel. This classification of the Guard as a state rather than
a federal entity stems from the original concept of its purpose and
organization. I
The National Guard of the United States is a direct descendant
of what was formerly called the militia, which consisted of troops
formed and maintained by the individual states., The Constitution
of the United States authorizes the existence of the state militia
and also gives Congress the power of "calling forth the Militia to
execute the laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel
Invasions. ' 2 However, the National Guard of today bears little
resemblance to the "minutemen" and volunteer citizen-soldier
forces which comprised the original militia. Federal legislation
3
which authorized appropriations for the support of the National
Guard required the units to meet certain standards for "federal
recognition" before they were eligible for the federal funds. A
uniformly well trained reserve military force of approximately a
half million men4 is eloquent testimony to the effectiveness of
the present system. Nevertheless, it has resulted in virtually com-
plete federal control of the National Guard.
REMEDY OF THE INJURED PARTY
The problem can best be described in terms of a hypothetical
situation; A is injured by B's negligence in connection with B's
1. 13 COLLIERS ENCYCLOPEDIA 585 (1955).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
3. The Dick Act of 1903 (32 Stat. 775), provided for the organization of the National
Guard and the National Defense Act of 1916 (39 Stat. 166), exercised the congressional
power of regulation of the militia. Subsequent acts of 1920, (41 Stat. 759), 1933 (48 Stat.
153), and 1956 (70A Stat. 1) amended and codified the laws but the basic framework
remains the same as that provided by the 1916 and 1920 legislation.
4. 1965 COLLIERS ENCYCLOPEDIA YEARBOOK 589. In 1964, the Army National Guard had
395,000 men on drill pay st atus and the Air National Guard had 75,000. These figures are
undoubtedly higher at the present time due to the military reserve reorganization.
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duties as an employee of a company or corporation. A's remedy in
this situation is an action for damages against B's employer under
the doctrine of respondeat superior. If B happens to be an em-
ployee of a federal agency or a soldier in the United States
Army, A may then bring his action against the United States in
accordance with the Federal Tort Claims Act.5 However, if B is
a National Guardsman, A's remedy must be either recovery under
an administrative remedy6 or an action for damages against the
guardsman personally because B is not considered a federal em-
ployee within the meaning of the Federal Tort Claims Act. The
injustice, with respect to both the guardsman and the injured
party, of such a situation is obvious. The victim of the tort is,
for all practical purposes, without a legal remedy and the guardsman
is subjected to tort liability arising from his military service.
The basis of the problem, the well established doctrine of gov-
ernmental immunity, has its roots in the English common law doc-
trine of sovereign immunity. The United States Supreme Court,
in 1896 said that "the United States, however, like all sovereigns,
cannot be impleaded in a judicial tribunal, except so far as they
have consented to be sued." 7 The United States has, of course,
given such consent by the enactment of the Federal Tort Claims
Act. 8 This Act imposes liability upon the United States for death
or injury caused by the negligence or wrongful act or omission of
"any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of
his office or employment, under circumstances where the United
States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in
accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred."9 The term, "employee of the government", as defined
by statute, "includes officers or employees of any federal agency,
members of the military or naval forces of the United States, and
persons acting on behalf of a federal agency in an official capacity,
temporarily or permanently in the service of the United States,
whether with or without compensation. '" 10 The term "employee"
has also been held to have the same general meaning as the term
"servant" has in the body of rules relating to the doctrine of
respondeat superior." The result is that liability for a particular
tort will not fall upon the United States unless the tortfeasor can
be classed as a federal employee acting within the scope of his
employment.
Former decisions concerning National Guard personnel and the
5. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346; 1402; 1504; 2110; 2401; 2402; 2671-2680 (1964).
6. 32 U.S.C. § 715.
7. Belknap v. Schild, 161 U.S. 10, 16 (1896).
8. Supra note 5.
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (b) (1964).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1964). This section also states: " 'Acting within the scope of his
office or employment', in the case of a member of the military or naval forces of the
United States, means acting In the line of duty."
11. Brucker v. United States, 338 F.2d 427 (9th Cir. 1964).
NoTEs
Federal Tort Claims Act, divided guardsmen into two classes: the
regular guardsman on "drill" status and the National Guard em-
ployee hired pursuant to the "caretaker" statute.12 With one ex-
ception, 18 the decisions have been uniform in holding that a
regular member of the National Guard is not a federal employee
within the meaning of the Act.14 It is worthy of note that in all
of the cases so holding, no significance was attached to the fol-
lowing factors:"" (1) that the guardsman was federally recognized,
(2) that he was compensated directly from federal funds, and (3)
that he was in possession and control of federally owned equipment
which was involved in the accident giving rise to the claim for
damages.
The cases deciding whether a National Guard employee or care-
taker is a federal employee are divided.- In those cases holding
that a caretaker is a federal employee, the following factors were
regarded as significant:17 (1) that the caretaker or maintenance
technician qualified for employment under federal regulations, (2)
that they were paid directly from federal funds and (3) that they
were responsible for repairs and maintenance of federally owned
equipment in accordance with prescribed regulations. These are
practically the same factors which were deemed immaterial in
deciding whether or not a non-employee National Guard member
is a federal employee under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
A 1965 United States Supreme Court decision, State of Mary-
land for the use of Levin v. United States,18 has now settled the
issue. This case arose out of a 1958 collision between a commercial
airliner and an Air National Guard jet trainer. The only survivor
was the pilot of the Guard trainer. Suits filed against the United
States under the Federal Tort Claims Act were appealed and
and eventually resulted in two United States Circuit Courts of Appeal
12. 32 U.S.C. § 709 (1964) authorizes National Guard units to employ persons meeting
federal standards as caretakers of the federal equipment entrusted to the Guard units.
13. O'Toole v. United States, 206 F.2d 912 (3rd Cir. 1953). This case Involved a motor
vehicle accident between a member of the District of Columbia National Guard and the
plaintiff. The court reasoned that there was a direct chain of command from the Presi-
dent on down to the enlisted man and, therefore, the guardsman was a federal employee
within the Federal Tort Claims Act.
14. Pattno v. United States, 311 F.2d 604 (10th Cir. 1962) cert. denied 373 U.S. 911
(1963) McCranie v. United States, 199 F.2d 581 (5th Cir. 1952). cert. denied 345 U.S. 922
(1953) ; Dover v. United States. 192 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1951) ; Williams v. United States,
189 F.2d 607 (10th Cir. 1951) ; Storer Broadcaslng Co. v. United States, 251 F.2d 268 (5th
Cir. 1958), cert. denied 356 U.S. 951 (1958) ; Slagle v. United States, 243 F.2d 404 (6th
Cir. 1957); Leary v. United States, 186 F. Supp. 953 (N.H.D. 1960); Gross v. United
States, 177 F. Supp. 766 (E.D.N.Y. 1959); Larkin v. United States, 118 F. Supp, 435
(N.D.N.Y. 1952).
15. State of Maryland for the use of Levin v. United States, 329 F.2d 722 (3rd Cir.
1964) (dictum).
16. Holding that caretaker is federal employee: United States v. State of Maryland for
the use of Meyer, 322 F.2d 1009 (DC Cir. 1963), cert. denied 375 U.S. 954 (1963) : Court-
ney v. United States, 230 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1956) : United States v. Duncan, 197 F.2d 233
(5th Cir. 1952) ; Elmo v. United States, 197 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1952) ; United States v.
Holly, 172 F.2d 221 (10th Cir. 1951). Holding that caretaker is not a federal employee;
Robin Construction Co. v. United States, 345 F.2d 610 (3rd Cir. 1965) ; State of Maryland
for the ues of Meyer, 322 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied 375 U.S. 954 (1963),
Pattno v. United States, 311 F.2d 604 (10th Cir. 1962).
17. State of Maryland for the use of Levin v. United States, 329 F.2d 722 (3rd Cir.
1964).
18. 381 U.S. 41 (1965).
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reaching conflicting decisions 9 on the issue of whether or not a
National Guard employee, hired pursuant to federal requirements, 2
0
is a federal employee within the meaning of the Federal Tort
Claims Act. The controversy was settled by the ruling that the
Guard pilot was a state and not a federal employee whether he
was acting in his capacity as a regular guardsman or as an
employee of the National Guard.
A proposal to extend the coverage of the Federal Tort Claims
Act to National Guard members and employees was rejected by
Congress in 1960.21 As an alternative, a bill was passed which
gives the secretary of the Army or Air Force, whichever is approp-
riate, authority to pay meritorious claims up to $5,000.00 for
personal injury or property damage caused by National Guard per-
sonnel. The statute also stipulates that claims exceeding $5,000.00
which the secretary of the military department concerned considers
meritorious may be paid to the extent of $5,000.00 and the excess
reported to Congress for its consideration.22 Civilian employees or
caretakers are also included in the provision despite the fact that
the majority of decisions on this issue prior to 1960 held that they
were included under the Tort Claims Act. This fact was pointed
out to Congress by the Justice Department, 23 but the committee
reports of both houses of Congress indicate acceptance of the
position of the Department of the Army that employees, as well as
regular member, should be included in the bill.24 Since this pro-
vision was passed in 1960 and the disaster involved in the Maryland
cases occurred in 1958, it is not applicable in this situation and the
only possibility for relief, as the Supreme Court stated, is for those
aggrieved to appeal to the benevolence of Congress.
25
A few states have remedied the situation by enacting statutes2 6
waiving their immunity from suit for tort claims. Goldstein v.
State of New York 27 is an example of an action brought under
such a statute. In this case, a guardsman was fatally injured due
to the negligence of a fellow guardsman. The court said that the
decedent was not a state employee so as to be covered by work-
men's compensation. It then followed that the negligent person
was not a state employee either, for the same reason that the
decedent was not, and therefore the state could not be held liable.
It would appear, by the reasoning of this case and the ruling of
19. State of Maryland for the use of Levin v. United States, supra note 17, held that
National Guard employees are not federal employees. United States v. State of Maryland
for the use of Meyer, 322 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cart. denied 375 U.S. 954 (1963),
held that they are.
20. Supra note 12.
21. S. 1764, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1959) ; H.R. 5435, 86th Cong. 2d Sess. (1959).
22. 32 U.S.C. § 715 (1964).
23. See S. REP. No. 1502, 86th Cong. 2d Sess. p. 11 (1959).
24. Supra note 23. See H.R. REP. No. 1928, 86th Cong. 2d Sess. (1960).
25. Supra note 18.
26. E.g. N.Y. CT. CL. ACT. §§ 8, 8-a; CAL. GOV'T COIO § 945.
27. 281 N.Y. 396, 24 N.E.2d 97 (1939).
the United States Supreme Court in the Maryland case, that the
guardsmen involved must be in the anomalous position of being
neither state nor federal employees. However, the deciding factor
here was the fact that both the tortfeasor and the victim were
guardsmen. The case indicates that the opposite result would have
been reached if the victim had not been a National Guardsman.
PERSONAL LIABILITY OF GUARDSMEN
Examination of the problem from the guardsman-tortfeasors
point of view also reveals a situation which is somewhat less than
desirable. A hypothetical will again be useful to illustrate: Con-
sider the same situation as that posed previously in this discussion
with the added facts that A's damages are $12,000.00 and that B
has savings which total approximately $12,000.00. In the first two
situations, the best remedy for A would remain the same, however,
if B is a guardsman, it might be advantageous for A to sue B
personally for the entire $12,000.00 rather than attempt to recover
$5,000.00 from the secretary of the Army or Air Force and have
the remaining $7,000.00 certified to Congress by the secretary of
the Army as provided in the administrative provision.8 A legal
remedy is in. many instances preferable to an administrative pro-
cedure, particularly if, as in this case, it is necessary to resort to
Congress to obtain full compensation.
There is considerable authority for the proposition that a
governmental employee can be held personally liable for torts
committed by him during the course of his employment. 29 The
United States Supreme Court in Belknap v. Schild30 stated: "But
the exemption of the United States from judicial process does not
protect their officers and agents, civil or military, in time of peace,
from being personally liable to an action of tort by a private person
whose rights of property have been wrongfully invaded or injured,
even by authority of the United States."8 1
Bates v. Clark32 also involved a military officer. Bates was
an Army captain in command of Fort Seward near Jamestown,
Dakota Territory. The action was brought by Clark, a merchant,
for damages because Bates had seized whiskey belonging to him
under the mistaken belief by Bates that he had authority to do so.
The officer was held personally liable in spite of his defense that
he was a subordinate acting under orders of a superior officer.
The court said that "military officers can no more protect them-
28. Supra note 18.
29. Belknap v. Schild, 161 U.S. 10 (1896) ; Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S. 204 (1877) ; Mitchell
V. Harmony, 54 U.S. 115 (1851) ; Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. 170 (1804) ; Burks v. United
States, 116 F.Supp. 337 (S.D.Tex. 1953); Devore v. Schaffer, 245 Iowa 1017, 65 N.W.2d
553 (1954); Rising v. Dickinson, 18 N.D. 478, 121 N.W. 616 (1909).
30. 161 U.S. 10 (1896).
31. Id. at 18.
82. 95 U.S. 204 (1877).
NOTES 369
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selves than civilians in time of peace by orders emanating from a
source which is itself without authority ....
It should be noted that even though a person is employed by
the government, which has waived its immunity from tort liability,
that person may still be held personally liable for torts committed
by him in the course of his employment. The initial liability may
be imposed on the United States by virtue of its waiver of immunity,
but the federal government may invoke the common law principle
that an employer who, without personal fault, is held liable to
third persons solely because of the doctrine of respondeat superior,
may recover indemnification from the responsible employee and
therefore the government could recover from its employee."
It seems to follow then, that it makes no difference so far as
the guardsman is concerned whether he is included within the
coverage of the Federal Tort Claims Act or not because it does
not affect personal liability. However, the practical truth is that
the government rarely seeks indemnification from an employee in
cases of ordinary negligence and the injured party would, more
than likely, seek damages from the government rather than try to
recover from the individual.
The requirement that the employee committing the tort must
have been "acting within the scope of his office or employment" 85
may also remove the person from the coverage of the Act. In
Brucker v. United States,36 a member of an Air Force base flying
club was injured in a crash of one of the club's planes. Another
member of the club was piloting the plane. The court held that
the pilot was not acting as an agent of the club at the time and
hence was not an agent of the United States so as to make him a
federal employee within the meaning of the Act.87 The District of
Columbia Circuit Court in State of Maryland for the use of Meyer,88
in contrast to the Third Circuit Courts determination in State of
Maryland for the use of Levin,89 found that the military officer
was acting within the scope of his employment as a civilian care-
taker and thus was a United States employee. The Third Circuit
Courts interpretation of the "scope of office or employment" re-
quirement seems to be unduly narrow and strict,40 although it is
not without precedent.41
33. Id. at 209.
34. Burks v. United States, supra note 29. The Court states at 339: "There can be no
doubt that the governmental employee here would be liable to the claimant under thepresent facts had that claim been asserted. It has long been established that governmental
employees are personally liable for their own torts to third persons, committed in the
course of employment. Such employees are still citizens and their employment by the Gov-
ernment is no cloak of immunity. The same rule of personal liability prevails as to mem-
bers of the Armed Forces.
35. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (b) (1964).
36. 338 F.2d 427 (9th Cir. 1964).
37. Accord: United States v. Hainline, 315 F.2d 153 (10th Cir. 1963).
38. 322 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
39. 329 F.2d 722 (Ord Cir. 1964).
40. See 329 F.2d 722 (3rd Cir. 1964) (dissenting opinion.)
41. In Watt v. United States, 123 F.Supp. 906 (E.D.Ark. 1954) an administrative as-
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It does not appear that the passage of the Act of 19602 has
rectified the ill effects of the exclusion of guardsmen from the
coverage of the Tort Claims Act. Undoubtedly, the plight of an
individual who suffers personal injury or property damage because
of the negligence of a guardsman is not as hopeless as it was prior
to the Act. Nevertheless, as previously pointed out, the adminis-
trative procedure may not always be satisfactory to an injured
claimant and he still has no action at law against the United States
for his damages.
The United States Supreme Court in the Maryland case recog-
nized the unfortunate consequences of this decision in stating:
In so holding we are not unmindful that this doubtless
leaves those who suffered from this accident without effective
legal redress for their losses. It is nevertheless our duty
to take the law as we find it, remitting those aggrieved to
whatever requitement may be deemed appropriate by Con-
gress, which in affording the administrative remedies, un-
fortunately not available here, has shown itself not imper-
vious to the moral demands of such distressing situations.
4 3
This expression of regret is also applicable to incidents occurring
subsequent to 1960 because the victim must still depend upon
Congress for any relief exceeding $5,000.00.
GUARDSMEN-STATE OR FEDERAL EMPLOYEES
The obvious solution, once rejected by Congress," is to include
members and employees of the National Guard within the scope of
the Federal Tort Claims Act by legislative enactment. The argu-
ment that the Guard and the regular armed forces and reserves
should be treated differently has certain historical support, but the
present day status of the National Guard indicates that the dis-
tinction is without merit.
The legislative Act of June 15, 193345 established the National
Guard as a "reserve component of the Army of the United States."
The United States Code states that the "Army National Guard of
the United States means the reserve component of the Army all
of whose members are members of the Army National Guard."
4
6
sistant of the Arkansas National Guard was held to be a federal employee within the
meaning of the Federal Tort Claims Act but the court held that he was not acting within
the scope of his employment because he was driving a truck and his duties were supposed
to be clerical in nature. This result was reached in spite of the fact that he was driving
the truck on an errand for the Guard unit. In United States v. Taylor, 236 F.2d 649 (6th
Cir. 1956) plaintiffs were denied recovery for injuries from falling debris and gasoline
from an Air Force plane which exploded in midair. The pilot had departed from his sched-
uled route and was making low altitude, high speed passes over his home town when the
mishap occurred. The court held that he was not acting within the scope of his employ-
ment. But see the dissenting opinion.
42. 32 U.S.C. § 715 (1964).
43. 381 U.S. 41, 53 (1965).
44. S. 1764, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1959) ; H.1R. 5435, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1959).
45. 48 Stat. 153.
46. 32 U.S.C. § 101(5) (1964). The provision applicable to the Air National Guard Is
32 U.S.C. § 101(7) (1964).
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Many other sections of the Code 47 also refer to the National Guard
of the United States as a reserve component of the United States
Army or Air Force. These provisions clearly point out that the
guardsman is also a reservist. That being the case, he should be
entitled to the same treatment under the Federal Tort Claims Act
as other reservists.
The legislative enactments concerning the National Guard and
the degree of control presently exercised by the federal government
give strong support to the contention that the Guard is a state
organization in name only. Even though the Guard is supposedly
under the control of the adjutant general of the state, the Dick
Act of 190348 stated that the President could call up the militia
for a period up to nine months to repel invasions. Refusal by a
guardsman to present himself for such muster resulted in his trial
by court-martial. It also provided that arms and equipment were
to be issued to the states at no cost and that the equipment was
to remain the property of the United States. The 1916 Act 9 pro-
vided that the organization of the National Guard shall be the same
as the regular Army, forbid states to maintain troops other than
the National Guard, and provided for appropriations to support the
Guard. These are only a few illustrations of the exercise of federal
control over the Guard. The list could be extended much further. 0
The degree of financial support of the National Guard provided
by the federal government provides further evidence that it is a
federal organization. For example, the North Dakota Air National
Guard during 1965 received over $214 million in federal funds as
compared to $20,900 in state funds. This is less than one per cent
of the total and the comparison does not take into account the fact
that all of the equipment is owned by the United States. 51 It has
been suggested that the Guard is merely another example of a
federal aid program52 and that the federal government only exer-
cises sufficient control to prevent reckless and excessive expend-
itures. The degree of federal financial support given and the con-
trol exercised in other federally subsidized activities, however, does
not even approach that involved in the National Guard, particularly
in the matter of payment of salaries of personnel. Federal "aid"
and complete federal control and support are not the same.
Because the evidence seems to support the contention that a
47. E.g., 32 U.S.C. § § 102; 8062; 8077; 8261; 8351 (1964).
48. 32 Stat. 775.
49. 39 Stat. 166.
50. E.g. 10 U.S.C. § 332 (1964). This section was used to federalize the National Guard
in Alabama to enforce school integration in accordance with federal law and contrary to
the wishes of the state. Exec. Order No. 11111, 28 Fed. Reg. 5709 (1963) ; Exec. Order No.
11118, 28 Fed. Reg. 9863 (1963).
51. Figures obtained from Major James Buzick, North Dakota Air National Guard Comp-
troller. Most of the state funds received by the unit are used to pay the salaries of four
groundskeeper-maintenance type personnel who receive their paychecks directly from the
state. These men are actually state employees.
52. See State of Maryland for the use of Levin v. United States, 329 F.2d 722 (3rd
Cir. 1964) (citing the Federal Highway Act of 1958, 23 U.S.C. § 101 (1964).
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guardsman is a federal employee within the meaning of the Federal
Tort Claims Act, a more liberal interpretation of its coverage than
was given in State of Maryland for the use of Levin would have
been proper. The Act should be liberally construed to avoid a
deluge of persons seeking relief for claims from Congress. This is
the purpose of the Act5 8 Mr. Justice Jackson, regarding the Federal
Tort Claims Act, stated:
This Act, however, should be construed to fit, so far as
will comport with its words, into the entire statutory system
of remedies against the Government to make a workable,
consistent and equitable whole. The Tort Claims Act was
not an isolated and spontaneous flash of congressional gener-
osity. It marks the culmination of a long effort to mitigate
unjust consequences of sovereign immunity from suit. While
the political theory that the King could do no wrong was
repudiated in America, a legal doctrine derived from it that
the Crown is immune from any suit to which it has not
consented was invoked on behalf of the Republic and applied
by our courts as vigorously as it had been on behalf of
the Crown. As the Federal Government expanded it's activi-
ties, its agents caused a multiplying number of remediless
wrongs-wrongs which would have been actionable if inflicted
by an individual or a corporation but remediless solely
because their perpetrator was an officer or employee of the
Government. . . At last, in connection with the Reorganiza-
tion Act, it waived immunity and transferred the burden of
examining tort claims to the courts. The primary purpose
of the Act was to extend a remedy to those who had been
without; . . . "
CONCLUSION
The statutory provision, allowing payment of claims for damages
caused by guardsmen, is inadequate as protection for the individual
members of the National Guard. The only remaining course open
to the guardsman is to purchase personal liability insurance. How-
ever, there is very little to recommend such a solution. A person
in any military service should not be required to purchase insur-
ance with his own funds in order to protect himself from liability
which might arise out of that service.
It is respectfully submitted that the administrative remedy pro-
vided in the 1960 legislation is not adequate nor does it give the
guardsman the measure of protection to which he is entitled as a
member of the United States military forces. Furthermore, the
Act has destroyed any possibility for courts to construe the Federal
53. E.g. United States v. Praylou, 208 F.2d 291 (4th Cir. 1953) cert. denied 347 U.S.
934 (1954); Somerset Seafood Co. v. United States, 193 F.2d 631 (4th Cir. 1951); State
Farm Mutual Liability Insurance Co. v. United States, 172 F.2d 737 (1st Cir. 1949).
54. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139 (1950).
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Tort Claims Act in favor of a National Guard member or employee.
Congress has decided the issue by legislatively declaring that a
guardsman is not a federal employee under the Federal Tort
Claims Act. Therefore, only Congress can reverse this position.
WAYNE 0. SOLBERG
